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CIVIL PROCEDURE-JuDGMENTS-MUTUAUTY AS REQUIREMENT FOR 
ASSERTION OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AGAINST CLAIMANT WHO WAS CLAIMEE 
IN PRIOR ACTION-Plaintiff corporations, the sole shareholder of which was 
their president, sued defendant insurers to recover for the alleged theft 
of the corporations' furs. In an earlier criminal action, the president (con-
ceded by the corporations to be their mere alter ego for purposes of res 
judicata) had been convicted of attempted grand theft, conspiracy to com-
mit grand theft, and the filing of fraudulent insurance claims for loss of 
the same furs; it was there determined that the president had staged the 
theft of the furs. In plaintiffs' civil action, the superior court rejected 
defendants' plea of collateral estoppel as to the non-occurrence of an actual 
theft, but, after verdict for plaintiffs, granted defendants a new trial. On 
appeal, held, reversed and entry of judgment for defendants directed. Even 
in the absence of mutuality of estoppel, a claimant which was claimee in 
a prior action may be collaterally estopped to assert the existence of a fact 
vital to its cause of action in a second suit if the non-existence of that fact 
was adjudicated in the prior action. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion 
Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 375 P.2d 439 (1962). 
Unlike merger and bar, collateral estoppel is a form of res judicata 
which precludes the relitigation of factual issues actually determined in a 
prior action.1 Traditionally, collateral estoppel could be applied only 
1 By contrast, in merger and bar the first judgment is conclusive both as to matters 
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where there was mutuality of estoppel; that is, unless both of the adverse 
parties to the subsequent action were subject to being estopped to contest 
factual issues already resolved in a prior action, neither party could be 
so estopped. An exception to the mutuality requirement developed in 
cases in which the liability of the defendant in the second suit would 
be dependent upon the culpability of a person who had been exonerated in 
a prior suit brought by the same plaintiff on the same facts as would be 
necessary to maintain the second action.2 For example, if A sued a truck 
driver and lost, collateral estoppel would preclude A's subsequent suit, 
based on respondeat superior, against the driver's employer.8 In many 
jurisdictions, this exception has evolved into a partial rejection of the 
mutuality requirement.4 
In the context of the question whether the party to be estopped was 
claimant in the first action, in the second action, in both actions, or in 
neither action, there are four possible exceptions to the mutuality require-
ment; while no court has abolished the mutuality requirement in all four 
situations, California has now specifically rejected the requirement in three 
of them. A number of courts have held that there is no mutuality re-
quirement where the party against whom the estoppel is pleaded was 
claimant in both the first and second actions. This is attributable to the 
courts' reluctance to permit a plaintiff to retry his case each time a new 
defendant can be found.IS In Bernhard v. Bank of America,6 one such 
case, the California court stated by way of dictum that there were only 
three substantive requisites for the assertion of a collateral estoppel: (1) 
that there be identity of issue, (2) that the first action have proceeded to a 
final judgment on the merits, and (3) that the party against whom the estop-
pel is asserted have been a party, or in privity with a party, to the first ac-
tion.7 Obviously, this rule was much broader than was required by the facts 
of the Bernhard case, where the party estopped was claimant in both actions. 
actually litigated, and as to those matters which might have been litigated. See REsrATE• 
MENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 47, 48 (1942). But direct estoppel, a fourth form of res judicata, 
precludes the plaintiff from relitigating only those matters actually determined in a prior 
action on the same cause of action. See id. § 45(c). 
2 Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. lll, 127 (1912) (dictum). See also 
57 HARV. L. REV. 98, 105 (1943). 
8 Further illustrations of this exception are the relationships of principal and agent, 
and indemnitor and indemnitee. 
4 In some cases courts have said that they no longer require mutuality of estoppel, 
even though those cases, on their facts, would fall within the master-servant or indemnitor-
indemnitee exceptions. E.g., Cohen v. Superior Oil Corp., 16 F. Supp. 221 (D. Del. 1936); 
Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (1937). 
IS Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W.2d 364 (1955). In Coca-Cola Co. 
v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. (6 Harr.) 124, 172 Atl. 260 (1934), the court rejected the 
mutuality requirement on the ground that the plaintiff had selected his forum in a prior 
action, and, having had a full opportunity to present his proofs, he should not be per• 
mitted to relitigate the same issues against a second defendant. 
6 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P .2d 892 (1942). 
7 Id. at 813, 122 P.2d at 895. 
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In Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Valentine, a California court went farther and, 
following Bernhard, implicitly rejected the mutuality requirement for the 
collateral estoppel of a claimee who had been the losing claimant in the 
prior action.8 The principal case, going yet a step farther on the authority 
of the Bernhard dictum, was the first to hold mutuality unnecessary in the 
third situation9-where the party estopped is claimant in the second action 
but was claimee in the first action.10 If the California court continues 
this trend and follows the Bernhard doctrine to its logical conclusion, it 
may eventually reject the mutuality requirement in the fourth possible 
situation. That situation involves the estoppel of a party who was the 
claimee in both the first and second actions. Suppose, for example, that 
an airplane disaster should take the lives of forty passengers. Under the 
broad language of the Bernhard dictum and the equally broad rule pro-
posed by numerous commentators,11 the judgment in the first wrongful 
death action against the airline, if successful, would collaterally estop the 
carrier to deny liability in the remaining thirty-nine suits. No court, how-
ever, has gone this far to date.12 
Due process of law prohibits the collateral estoppel of one who has not 
had his day in court.18 Where due process is not violated, the problem is 
simply one of fairness: to what extent should the mutuality requirement 
be discarded in order to estop one who has already had an opportunity 
to litigate the elements of his claim or defense? This determination should 
result from a balancing of the policy underlying res judicata-that there be 
s 119 Cal. App. 2d 125, 259 P .2d 70 (1953). , 
II In Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927), 
plaintiff brought an action on a fire insurance policy. In an earlier action, plaintiff had 
been convicted of burning the same goods for the loss of which he now claimed. In a 
perplexing opinion, the court said that the judgment in the first action was not res 
judicata because of the lack of mutuality. However, inasmuch as plaintiff had previously 
had his day in court on the same issues, he was not permitted to re-open them in the 
subsequent action. 
10 If a court applies collateral estoppel where the prior action was criminal, as in 
the principal case, it would most probably also apply it where the prior action was civil. 
The courts would be more hesitant to allow collateral estoppel where the prior action 
was criminal, since the privilege against self-incrimination would have permitted the 
defendant to keep much of his proof undisclosed. This would at least balance the fact 
that a greater burden of proof is required for a criminal conviction. 
11 See, e.g., Cox, Res Adjudicata: Who Entitled To Plead, 9 VA. L. REG. (n.s.) 241 
(1923); 35 YALE L.J. 607, 611 (1926): "Assuming an identity of issue and a judgment on 
the merits, the only requirement should be that the one against whom the former judg-
ment is invoked was a party, or a privy of a party, to it." 
12 One court has permitted the former judgment to be "conclusive evidence" against 
one who was claimee in both the prior and the subsequent cases. United States v. 'Wexler, 
8 F.2d 880 (E.D.N.Y. 1925). However, the case presented no possibility of multiple claim-
ants. In the first action a divorce had been obtained against the defendant on grounds of 
adultery. The second action was brought to set aside the defendant's certificate of 
naturalization on the ground of immoral character. 
13 United Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 172 F. Supp. 580, 588 (D. Conn. 1959). 
An exception to this rule is the case where a party has participated in the prior adjudica• 
tion as a "secret defendant." Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 120 
F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1941). 
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an end to litigation1~against the prejudice resulting to the litigant against 
whom the estoppel is asserted.15 
One reason offered in justification of the mutuality requirement is that 
litigants do not always defend or prosecute to the utmost; thus, failure 
in the first suit should not preclude a more energetic subsequent contest.16 
However, the courts have already rejected this argument in the master-
servant exception to the mutuality requirement, for a plaintiff's failure to 
succeed in an action against the servant is universally held to preclude the 
possibility of a more energetic subsequent contest against the master. Like-
wise, in the Bernhard and Valentine situations, the unsuccessful claimants 
in the prior actions were precluded from attempting more energetic con-
tests against other adversaries in subsequent actions. In short, the failure 
of parties to prosecute or defend to the utmost on all occasions has appar-
ently been of no moment to courts deciding cases which present the same 
policy considerations as the principal case; evidently, then, the possibility 
of a desultory prosecution or defense of the first case should not be en-
tirely determinative of the solution to the problem. 
In the principal case, the court correctly rejected the argument that 
mutuality should always be required for the collateral estoppel of one 
who was the claimee in the prior action.17 To require mutuality in all such 
cases would be unresponsive to the fundamental considerations of policy 
underlying the rejection of the mutuality requirement in other situations. 
The better view would be that mutuality should not be required for col-
lateral estoppel where it is shown that the party estopped had an oppor-
tunity to present his full case in the prior action, and that he would not 
be prejudiced by the application of estoppel. In the principal case, for 
example, both of these requisites were fully met. The parties estopped 
had the fullest opportunity in the first action to present their case as to 
the occurrence of an actual theft,18 and, being claimants in the subsequent 
action, they were able to choose the forum and set the bounds of the liti-
gation. 
More significant, perhaps, was the California court's uncritical willing-
ness, in the principal case, to follow the Bernhard dictum without recon-
sidering the policy behind the principle of mutuality. The language of 
14 E.g., Marsh v. Pier, 4 Rawle 273, 288 (Pa. 1833). But see Atkinson v. White, 60 
Me. 396 (1872). 
15 See principal case at 604, 375 P .2d at 441. 
18 See Von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299 (1929). 
17 Professor Currie argues that, where the claimee in the prior action is the claimant 
in the subsequent action, mutuality should be required, because he did not have the 
initiative in the former adjudication. He argues that, without mutuality, there would be 
a danger of multiple claimants. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the 
Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, 312 (1957). However, in his example of a bus 
company being sued by one passenger and subsequently by others, the company is 
claimce in both instances. Should the bus company desire to become claimant in a suit 
against the operator of another vehicle, the multiple claimant problem would not be 
present in such subsequent suit. 
18 See note IO supra. 
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the opinion19 makes it clear that the court did not recognize the danger 
that its reaffirmation of the Bernhard doctrine might precipitate the ex-
tension of that doctrine to instances where the party to be estopped is 
claimee in both actions and there is a possibility of multiple claimants, 
e.g., the hypothetical airplane disaster.20 Abolition of the mutuality re-
quirement in this situation would prejudice the claimee in two distinct 
ways. First, the jury might compromise the liability question by finding 
for the first plaintiff and awarding proportionately lower damages. In all 
subsequent actions brought by other plaintiffs, the claimee would be 
estopped to deny liability, and only the question of damages would be 
submitted to the jury. In such subsequent actions, the juries would be 
likely to render verdicts for the full amounts of the respective claimants' 
damages.21 The claimee would be prejudiced in a second way by having 
to withstand the probability that more claimants would recover. For e:l{-
ample, where forty plaintiffs join in a class action or, without being able 
to benefit from res judicata, sue independently in separate actions, the 
claimee risks a full recovery by each plaintiff only once. However, without 
the mutuality requirement, were the plaintiffs to sue one at a time, the 
claimee in defending the first suit would actually be risking a full recovery 
by all forty. In the second suit he would be risking full recovery by thirty-
nine, etc. While the claimee would be subject to the same maximum re-
covery, the chances of recovery would be greatly enhanced. Assuming that 
all plaintiffs sued and were unsuccessful, the last plaintiff to sue would have 
had forty opportunities for recovery. With forty plaintiffs, there would 
have been eight hundred and twenty opportunities for single-plaintiff re-
covery. The factor by which the opportunities for recovery are multiplied 
becomes larger as the number of possible plaintiffs grows. Such increased 
opportunities for single-plaintiff recovery would have a disruptive effect 
on insurance rates. In the final analysis, then, the requirement of mutu-
ality should be retained only where the party to be estopped was unable, 
by reason of his opponent's initiative, to present his full case in the prior 
action, or where his status as claimee in both actions would expose him 
to a greater risk of recovery by reason of a possible procession of claimants. 
William E. Wickens 
19 See principal case at 604, 605, 375 P .2d at 440, 441. 
20 United States v. Wexler, 8 F.2d 880 (EJ).N.Y. 1925), illustrates that a claimee who 
was claimee in the prior action might not be prejudiced by his being collaterally estopped 
in the absence of mutuality. See note 12 supra. 
21 See Currie, supra note 17, at 288, 
